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Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the causality between inventor productivity and inventor mobility. The 
results show that the level of education has no influence on inventor productivity. Making use 
of external sources of knowledge, on the contrary, has a significant effect on productivity. 
Finally, firm size has a positive impact on productivity. Firm size also influences inventor 
mobility, although negatively. Whereas existing research implicitly assumes causality to point 
in one direction, this study ex ante allows for a simultaneous relationship. To deal with the 
expected endogeneity problem, instrumental variables techniques (IVREG and IVPROBIT) 
will be employed. Results show that mobile inventors are more productive than non-movers. 
Whereas a move increases productivity, an increase in productivity decreases the probability 
to observe a move.  
Keywords:  Inventor, Productivity, Mobility, Match Quality, Patent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the conference audience at the 33rd Conference of E.A.R.I.E. in August 2006 as well as the 
conference audience at the 1st Annual Conference of the EPIP Association "Policy, Law and Economics of 
Intellectual Property" in September 2006 for helpful comments. Special thanks go to Dietmar Harhoff, Jesse 
Giummo, Marc Gruber, Stefan Wagner, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. The survey 
responses used in this analysis originate from a coordinated survey effort in Italy, France, Spain, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany. The author thanks the European Commission, Contract N. 
HPV2-CT-2001-00013, for supporting the creation of the joint dataset. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 2 
1 Introduction  
In 1998, Kai-Fu Lee, an expert on speech recognition and search technologies, moved to 
Microsoft to found the Chinese Microsoft research division in Beijing. In 2000, he became 
vice president of interactive services at Microsoft. In July 2005, Lee left Microsoft to work 
for Google. While working for Microsoft, Lee had signed a non-compete agreement, which 
barred him from working in research areas competing with Microsoft within one year after 
leaving the company. On July 19, 2005, after Google had announced that Lee would “serve as 
President of the company's growing Chinese operations”1 Microsoft sued Google and Lee. 
Microsoft claimed that Lee was violating his non-compete agreement, since working for 
Google would unavoidably lead to the disclosure of technical know-how to Google. On July 
28, the Washington State Superior Court enacted a preliminary injunction, which prevented 
Lee from working on Google projects that competed with Microsoft. On December 22, 2005, 
Google and Microsoft announced that they had entered into a private agreement, which put an 
end to the dispute between the two companies.2 
The Google-Microsoft story gives first insights into possible consequences of a key employee 
leaving a firm. Kai-Fu Lee is an expert in the field of speech recognition and search 
technology. A move from Microsoft to Google not only weakened the position of Microsoft 
in this research field but also strengthened the position of the competitor. For Microsoft a 
legitimate reason to take court action. Given this story, it would be interesting to learn more 
about the mobility of productive inventors. 
                                                 
1
  See http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/rd_china.html (access on January 5, 2007). 
2
   See http://news.com.com/Microsoft+sues+over+Google+hire/2100-1014_3-5795051.html as well as 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kai-Fu_Lee (access on August 14, 2006). 
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On the one hand mobility may effect productivity. R&D personnel3 are exposed to a new 
environment that affects their activity. For instance, Topel and Ward (1992) propose that 
mobility can lead to an increase of the match quality between employer and employee. A 
better match quality should lead to an increase in the inventor’s own productivity. A move 
can, therefore, be interpreted as a search and sorting process to improve the employer-
employee match. The importance of match quality is also confirmed by Jovanovic (1979) and 
Liu (1986). Furthermore, the inventor may profit from the knowledge of his new colleagues. 
This could also increase the productivity of an inventor in the after-move period. One might, 
therefore, expect that mobility increases productivity4.  
On the other hand the causality may run in the opposite direction with productivity increasing 
mobility. The literature reveals that hiring a key inventor from another firm can lead to 
knowledge transfer (Arrow, 1962, Song et al. 2003). Firms characterized by a lower 
technology level can use this knowledge to catch up and thus are motivated to attract 
productive inventors (Gilfillan 1935). In particular, the transfer of tacit knowledge, that is 
otherwise immobile, is facilitated by inventor mobility (Dosi 1988). One could, therefore, 
assume that the causality runs from productivity to mobility: the more productive an inventor 
is, the higher the probability to observe a move. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that 
inventors who are very valuable to their employers may be treated with particular attention. 
Consequently, employers try to increase the commitment of these inventors to the firm by 
providing certain incentives. Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003), e.g., propose that firms can 
keep their employees from leaving by offering sufficiently high wages. Assuming that the 
                                                 
3
   Mobile inventors are defined in this paper as inventors who have changed their employer at least once. 
4
  The productivity of inventors is measured by relating the number of patent applications per inventor to the 
age of the inventor. 
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firms are able to observe the quality of an R&D employee one would expect that valuable 
employees get job offers from competitors but mobility does not actually occur.  
With the exception of Trajtenberg’s work, no other research focusing on inventors has been 
carried out on the simultaneous relationship between productivity and mobility. Trajtenberg 
(2005) addresses the causality between mobility and productivity of 1,565,780 inventors 
listed on U.S. patent documents. Overall, 216,581 (33%) of the inventors are movers, which 
means that these inventors changed their employer at least once. Results show that the patents 
of inventors who moved receive more citations. Additionally, inventors who are responsible 
for a valuable patent and who ex ante have more information as to the value of this patent 
compared to their employers are more likely to move. A possible explanation is that 
asymmetric information makes it difficult for the employer to impede mobility of high 
performing inventors. Especially if another firm has better information and appropriately 
compensates the inventor. 
The following study improves on the current literature by (1) allowing for a simultaneous 
relationship of productivity and mobility, whereas existing research on inventors – with the 
exception of Trajtenberg (2005, 2006) - implicitly assumes causality to point in one way 
(from mobility to productivity or from productivity to mobility) and (2) by including inventor 
characteristics as explanatory variables. One reason for the lack of literature dealing with this 
causality is the absence of appropriate data. First of all, a matching problem exists with 
respect to name and address information derived from the patent documents.5 Furthermore, 
bibliographic and procedural data hardly suffice to represent the most important determinants 
of productivity or mobility. Additional information is needed on the inventor himself, for 
instance, on the inventor’s age or educational background. This paper makes use of data 
                                                 
5
  See for instance Hall (2004): The Patent Name-Matching Project, http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/pat/ 
namematch/namematch.html (access on November 28, 2005). 
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collected in a large-scale survey of 3,049 German inventors who hold at least one granted 
European patent. The inventors were requested to provide demographic information as well as 
information on the R&D process underlying their patented invention. To trace the mobility 
and the productivity of each inventor over time, the EPOLINE database of the European 
Patent Office was used to search for all patent applications belonging to the 3,049 inventors 
with priority dates between 1977 and 2002, resulting in a total of 39,417 EP patent 
applications.  
To deal with the expected endogeneity problem caused by mobility and productivity, 
instrumental variables techniques will be employed. The results show that the level of 
education has no influence on inventor productivity. Making use of external sources of 
knowledge, on the contrary, has a significant effect on productivity. In particular, exploiting 
the knowledge from scientific literature increases inventive output. Finally, firm size has a 
positive impact on productivity. Firm size also influences inventor mobility, although 
negatively. Furthermore, the temporal concentration of inventive activity and the inventive 
environment are major determinants of mobility. The number of moves decreases with the 
temporal concentration of inventive activity and it is higher in large cities compared to rural 
areas. Overall, results confirm the simultaneous relationship between inventor productivity 
and inventor mobility. Whereas mobility increases productivity, an increase in productivity 
reduces the probability to observe a move.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the derivation of the 
hypotheses from the literature. A description of the dataset as well as the operationalization of 
the variables used in the empirical part of the paper are provided in section 3. Section 4 
provides descriptive statistics, followed by two models using instrumental variables 
techniques (IVREG and IVPROBIT) to analyze the causality between inventor productivity 
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and inventor mobility. Finally, section 5 discusses the estimation results and provides 
implications for further research.  
 
2 Hypotheses 
This section derives from the existing literature hypothesised determinants of inventor 
productivity and mobility 
 
• Inventor Productivity 
Shockley (1957) proposes that productivity is affected by many “mental factors”, such as the 
ability to detect important problems, technical skills and persistence. Since then, a large 
number of authors considered the dependence between education and ability, especially the 
appropriateness of education as a proxy for ability.6 Griliches (1970) suggests to “confess 
ignorance” with respect to the potential determinants of ability and define ability as gross 
output of the schooling system. This paper, according to the existing literature, measures 
intellectual ability using the level of education of the inventors. Assuming productivity is 
increasing in intellectual ability, the following relationship is expected: 
P.1:  Inventors with a high level of education tend to show higher productivity than 
inventors with a low level of education. 
 
Beyond the level of education, external sources of knowledge can positively influence 
inventor productivity. Patent documents, for instance, allow inventors not only to catch up on 
the state-of-the-art but also to collect relevant research information. Los and 
Verspagen (2003) characterize patent documents as a “potential source of ‘idea-creating’ 
knowledge spillovers” (Los/Verspagen 2003: 3). Allen (1977), von Hippel (1988) and 
                                                 
6
  See Becker (1964) and Denison (1964) for a survey of the relevant literature. 
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Freeman (1991) highlight the importance of users and competitors regarding the 
innovativeness of firms. The literature described above analyzes the influence of knowledge 
transfer on innovative output at the firm level. However, the results should also apply to the 
inventor level. Using different sources of knowledge should enable inventors to increase their 
inventive output. It is therefore hypothesized that 
P.2:  Inventors making use of patent literature, users’ knowledge or competitors’ 
knowledge are more productive than inventors who do not use these external sources 
of knowledge.  
 
Additional external sources of knowledge are university research and the scientific literature. 
Allen (1977) compares nineteen parallel R&D projects to analyze characteristics, 
distinguishing engineers from scientists. Two of them are scientific projects, the remaining 17 
are technological projects. Results show that scientists receive ideas from the literature, 
whereas engineers hardly use scientific literature and rather employ customers or suppliers as 
external sources of knowledge (Allen 1977).  
A possible explanation for this difference provides the concept of “absorptive capacity” 
(Cohen/Levinthal 1989, 1990). Absorptive capacity - the ability of a firm to recognize the 
value of external information, to assimilate and to apply it to commercial R&D - is required to 
profit from spillovers. The inventors’ absorptive capacity determines the extent to which the 
scientific knowledge can be assimilated and employed. Absorptive capacity in turn depends 
on the extent to which the inventor is used to using scientific sources of knowledge. It is, 
therefore, assumed that inventors who did doctoral or postdoctoral studies are more able to 
benefit from scientific research. The following relationship is proposed: 
P.3:  Inventors who conducted scientific research increase their productivity more by 
using university research or scientific literature than inventors who do not conduct 
scientific research. 
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Idson and Oi (1999) find a positive relationship between labor productivity and firm size 
because large firms are generally early adopters of new technology. Additionally, they have 
more resources at their disposal to hire and retain high quality researchers. Kim et al. (2004) 
use longitudinal worker-firm matched data in the semiconductor and pharmaceutical 
industries. In both industries the authors find that inventor productivity increases with firm 
size. Research expenditures, sales and number of employees were used as alternative size 
measures. Based on the results of the existing literature, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
P.4:  Inventors who are employed by a large firm show a higher productivity than 
inventors working at small firms.  
 
• Inventor Mobility 
Spence (1973) suggests that hiring an employee constitutes an investment under uncertainty 
since the employer is not sure of the capabilities of an employee at the time he hires him. But 
certain characteristics of the individual are observable and hence can be used to decrease this 
uncertainty. For instance, the level of education of the inventor can be used as a signal for his 
qualification. Therefore, inventors with a higher level of education may get more job offers 
and consequently may move more often. It is therefore assumed that 
M.1:  Mobility is more common among inventors with a higher level of education than 
among inventors with a lower level of education.  
 
Additionally, monetary incentives can determine the decision of an inventor to change 
employers. Allen and Katz (1985) find that career systems of engineers and scientists are 
completely different. Engineers and scientists are often attracted by higher wages to undertake 
administrative roles. In general, career prospects are less promising for technical 
professionals. In cases, where progress in terms of salary or advancement is impossible within 
the current employment, a change of employer could help sustain their motivations. 
Therefore, the following relationship is expected: 
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M.2:  Mobility rates are higher the more important financial rewards and advancement are 
to the inventor. 
 
Furthermore, improvement of working conditions can be a motive to change the employer. 
Clark et al. (1998) use data of the German Socio-Economic Panel to examine the effects of 
job satisfaction on employees’ future termination behavior. Results show that workers who 
are dissatisfied with their jobs are more likely to quit compared to highly satisfied workers. 
Hence the following hypothesis is proposed: 
M.3:  The greater the inventor’s dissatisfaction with the work environment the greater the 
likelihood that they change firms. 
 
Topel/Ward (1992) use longitudinal employee-employer data containing records for over one 
million individuals between 1957 and 1972. The authors find that jobs are more stable in large 
firms. Particularly, the turnover rate in the smallest class is double that of the largest class 
(1-9 vs. 1000-2499 employees). A reason for this finding may be that large firms provide 
internal job markets.7 Careers can therefore develop within the firm and the employees need 
not move out. Allen and Katz (1985) proposed so-called “dual ladder” career systems 
providing more career chances for engineers. The probability that these career systems are 
established increases with firm size. Therefore, the following relationship is expected: 
M.4:  Mobility is less common among inventors employed with large firms compared to 
inventors employed with small firms. 
 
Finally, Marshall (1890) recognized that workers may be economically more valuable to one 
firm than to all other firms. The author stated that firm-specific human capital may be a 
reason for this phenomenon. Parsons (1972) finds that large investments in firm-specific 
                                                 
7
  See, for instance, Althauser (1989) for a review of theoretical and empirical studies on internal labor markets. 
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human capital, either by the firm or the worker, are likely to lead to reduced labor mobility, 
since the economic cost of worker-job separations is increased. An example for firm specific 
human capital is the technical specialization of an inventor. A highly firm specific technical 
concentration of inventive activity can lead to a lower value of an inventor in the labor 
market. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
M.5:  The narrower is the application of inventor specific human capital the lower is 
mobility. 
 
3 Data Source and Sample 
3.1 Description of the Data  
Data were collected in the course of a European project (called PatVal) sponsored by the 
European Commission. Units of observation are inventors who lived in Germany at the time 
of application of the respective patents. 10,500 EP patents attributed to inventors living in 
Germany were chosen as a stratified random sample based on a list of all granted EP patents 
with priority dates between 1993 and 1997 (15,595 EP patents). A stratified random sample 
was used in order to oversample potentially important patents.  
The first inventor listed on the patent document was chosen as addressee.8 Each inventor was 
provided with a cover letter together with a questionnaire. 3,346 responses were received, 
                                                 
8  The German Employees’ Invention Act provides a set of rules that characterize the relationship between an 
inventor and his employer. In general, the German Employees’ Invention Act (GEIA) applies to all 
inventions made by inventors in organizations which are governed under German law or in German 
subsidiaries of international organizations. According to § 5 GEIA inventors are obligated to report their 
inventions to the employer. If the employer does not claim the right to the invention, the invention is released 
to the inventor. In this case, the inventor can apply for a patent for this invention in his own name. In case of 
a claim to the invention (which is the case for approximately 95% of all inventions), all rights to the 
invention are transferred to the employer (§ 6 GEIA), and the employer is obligated to file a national patent 
application for the invention (§ 7 GEIA). (See http://www.arbeitnehmer-erfindergesetz.de/, access on 
December 18, 2006). 
 Both, the applicant and the inventor are mentioned in the patent document. According to Art. 81 European 
Patent Convention the applicant shall name the inventor(s) in the patent application and affirm that to his 
knowledge no other person has contributed to the invention. In case the applicant does not fulfil this 
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resulting in a response rate of 32%. The sample contains 2,761 inventors who answered one 
questionnaire and 288 inventors who filled out two to five questionnaires.9 Hence, the sample 
used in this paper contains 3,049 different inventors (representing 3,346 EP patents). The data 
from the questionnaire was merged with bibliographic and procedural information on the 
respective patents obtained from the online EPOLINE database. The dataset is a counterpart 
of the EPOLINE data as of March 1st, 2003, and covers approximately 1,200,000 patent files 
with application dates ranging from June 1st, 1978, to July 25th, 2002. To trace the 
productivity and the mobility of each inventor over time, the EPOLINE database was used to 
search for all patents belonging to the 3,049 inventors with priority dates between 1977 and 
2002.  The search procedure resulted in a total of 39,417 EP patents.  
For inventors holding only one patent (352 inventors) it is not possible to observe a move. 
Therefore, these inventors were excluded from the sample. The final sample contains 2,697 
inventors who are responsible for at least two patents during the time period under 
consideration.  
Prior to the description of the variables, some limitations of using patent data for tracing 
mobility und productivity should be mentioned. First of all, a matching problem exists due to 
a lack of standardization of the spelling of inventors’ names. This lack of standardization 
complicates the identification of inventors, especially of inventors with common last names. 
This may lead to an underestimation of patents per inventor and consequently to an 
underestimation of the number of moves. Second, identical names may refer to different 
inventors. Even if additional information, such as the name of the patent applicant, is applied, 
this could lead to an overestimation of the number of patents per inventor. Third, incomplete 
                                                                                                                                                        
obligation without cause, the patent office can refuse to grant the patent. (See http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html, access on December 18, 2006).  
9
  Inventors who were responsible for more than one patent in the underlying time period and who were chosen 
more than once by stratified random sample, were provided with up to five questionnaires. 
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address data and female inventors who changed their name due to marriage may also lead to 
wrong matches. 
If the matching procedure works well, it is possible to identify a move, but only if the 
inventor applied for another patent after he changed the employer. If an inventor moved but 
did not apply for any patents after this move, the data will not reveal the change of the 
employer. This could result in an underestimation of moves. Furthermore, this may lead to a 
selection bias, since the probability to observe a move increases with the number of patents 
per inventor, i.e. the probability to observe a move is higher for productive inventors. 
Information from the PatVal questionnaires on the mobility of less productive inventors was 
used to reduce this bias. Let us further assume that the patent documents of two successive 
patents contain different applicants. The fact that different applicants are listed does not 
automatically mean that the inventor changed jobs. A possible explanation for two different 
applicants is, for instance, a strategic alliance between two companies or a merger after which 
patent applications are filed under the applicant name of the new company. These effects may 
lead to an overestimation of mobility. The classification of “move” and “no move” will be 
described in more detail in the following section. The results from the PatVal questionnaires, 
including questions related to the mobility of the inventors, in particular to the employment 
before, during, and after the invention was made, were utilized to confirm the matching and 
mobility outcomes. However, the mentioned limitations have to be taken into account when 
deriving implications from the results. 
 
3.2 Variables  
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
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PRODUCTIVITY – The variable is defined as the number of applications per inventor10, 
divided by the age of the inventor in 2002 minus 25. A way of justifying this measure would 
be the assumption that inventors become active at the age of 25 and continue to invent with 
constant productivity. 
252002 −
=
age
nsapplicatioofnumberTYPRODUCTIVI  
MOBILITY – Based on the full sample, a dummy variable was created taking the value 1 in 
case the inventor moved and 0, otherwise. A move is defined as a change of the employer. 
The classification of “move” (the inventor changed the employer) and “no move” (the 
inventor did not change the employer) was corrected manually on the basis of the applicants 
listed in the EP documents. I made the assumption that the applicant listed on the patent 
document is also the employer of the respective inventor. To test this assumption, the 
responses from the PatVal-questionnaire were employed. The questionnaire included a 
question which asked the inventors whether the applicant listed on the patent document was 
also their employer. The results revealed that 92% of the questioned inventors were employed 
with the applicant of the patent. Since the firm applying for the patent is almost surely the 
employer of the inventor, it is assumed that this assumption should not lead to large biases, 
assigning it to all patent applications in the sample.  
The following three examples of chronological applicant sequences for particular inventors 
give some insight into the problem of distinguishing between move and no move: 
                                                 
10  Hoisl (2007) shows that citation counts may be a more appropriate measure for inventor productivity. In 
particular, citations which are a proxy for output quality are more dependent on the inventor himself. Patent 
counts in contrast are largely determined by the firm that is the R&D management decides whether to file a 
patent application or how much to spend on R&D. Using citation data, however, requires a five year period 
after publication of the search report in order to compare citation counts between patents. Whereas 
Hoisl (2007) applied patent applications between 1978 and 1999, this paper employs applications up to the 
year 2002. The years between 1999 and 2002 contain important information on mobility, which would 
otherwise be disregarded due to missing citation data. In the following, the better mobility information is 
preferred to the improved productivity measure; therefore, the number of patent applications is used as an 
output measure. 
(1) 
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[Table 1 about here] 
The first example displayed in Table 1 shows a sequence of 7 patents, applied for by two 
different applicants. Whereas the first change of the applicant is classified as a move, the 
second change is interpreted as an invention that was made during the employment with 
SIEMENS, which applied for a subsequent patent. This case was found quite frequently in the 
data. 26.4% of the mobile inventors have at least one patent application that belongs to this 
category. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows a second example: in this case, the inventor is the applicant of one of the 
patents and additionally, the applicants before and after this patent match completely (here: 
SIEMENS). It is assumed that this invention is a free invention which means that the 
applicant did not claim the right to this invention according to the German Employee 
Invention Act.11 Therefore, it is taken for granted that the inventor has not changed his 
employer. The data reveal that 3.7% of the mobile inventors have applied for at least one 
patent in their own name during employment with another firm. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The last example (Table 3) contains two patents from different applicants (SIEMENS and 
BASF) which were applied for on the same day. This case is also not treated as a move, since 
it is assumed that these two patents derive from research cooperation between these two 
firms. The data reveal that about 17.2% of the mobile inventors hold at least one pair of patent 
applications that belongs to the last category. 
 
                                                 
11
  A more detailed description of the German Employee Invention Act is presented in Harhoff and Hoisl (2005). 
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3.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
AGE - The age of the inventor was obtained from the questionnaire and represents the age at 
the time of the survey. Age is included in the productivity regression to estimate a coefficient 
for age instead of assuming the coefficient to be 1, i.e., to take a proportional relationship 
between adjusted patent counts and age for granted. The age of the inventor is also a control 
variable in the mobility model. 
LEVEL OF EDUCATION - The questionnaire asked the respondents for their highest 
attained degree. In order to simplify the analysis, the education variable was aggregated into 
three groups: (1) secondary school, high school diploma, or vocational training (reference 
group), (2) vocational academy (Berufsakademie) or university studies, and (3) doctoral or 
postdoctoral studies. 
EXTERNAL SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE - university research, scientific literature, 
patent literature, users, and competitors. The questionnaire included a question relating to 
the importance of different sources of knowledge for the development of an invention.12 
Answers were collected on a scale from one (absolutely not important) to five (very 
important). A dummy variable was created for each source of knowledge, combining 
categories 1 (absolutely not important) to 3 (partly important) as well as categories 4 
(important) and 5 (very important). The latter implies a use of the respective knowledge 
source. 
INCENTIVES - increase in salary, advancement, improvement of working conditions. 
The inventors were asked about the importance of different incentives for inventive activity. 
                                                 
12
 Although the answers to the questionnaire were related to specific patents, the answers seem to be transferable 
to all patents of an inventor. It is assumed that inventors basically tend to use special sources of knowledge, 
for example, due to positive experiences in the past. This assumption proves true, when comparing the 
answers of inventors who filled out more than one (five at the most) questionnaires. The different sources of 
knowledge are found to be equally important for all surveyed patents per inventor. Those answers that do not 
show a perfect match are at least highly correlated. The spearman correlation coefficients for the five different 
sources of knowledge range between 0.84 and 0.73. 
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Answers were again collected on a scale from one (absolutely not important) to five (very 
important). A dummy variable was created for each incentive, combining categories 1 
(absolutely not important) to 3 (partly important) as well as categories 4 (important) and 5 
(very important). For the latter group the dummy becomes 1; 0 otherwise. 
TECHNICAL AREA - Based on their International Patent Classification (IPC) codes, the 
patent applications were classified into 30 technical areas. This classification was proposed by 
Schmoch (OECD 1994). 
PATENT PROPENSITY – industry specific patenting intensity. Three dummy variables 
were generated, indicating whether the inventor is mainly active in industries with a low 
(reference group), medium or high patent propensity.  
According to the results of Arundel and Kabla (1998) as well as Brouwer and Kleinknecht 
(1999)13, first, the 30 technical areas were categorized as areas with a low, medium, and high 
patent propensity. In a second step, the patent applications per inventor were summarized 
over the different categories (low, medium and high patent propensity). For each inventor, the 
category possessing the largest number of patent applications was chosen as the patent 
propensity of the sectors in which he is basically active. If one category contained just as 
many applications as another, one category was chosen by random.  
TECHNICAL CONCENTRATION - share of patent applications in the same technical 
area. Using the 30 technical areas, a Herfindahl index was calculated. For each inventor, the 
number of applications in the technical area i divided by the total number of applications was 
                                                 
13
  Arundel and Kabla (1998) use a sample of Europe’s largest firms and define the sales-weighted percentages 
of innovations for which a patent application was filed as a proxy for the firms’ patent propensity. Brouwer 
and Kleinknecht (1999) use data on Dutch firms collected in the course of the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) in 1992. Firms were asked about their rating of the effectiveness of patents as a means to protect their 
product innovations against imitation. The answers, given on a five-point scale ranging from “insignificant” 
to “crucial”, were used to classify different manufacturing branches according to their propensity to patent.  
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calculated, in the following denoted by p. The Herfindahl index (HI), consequently, 
corresponds to the sum of squared shares of applications: 
∑=
i
ipHI
2
 
If all applications belong to one technical area, technical concentration is at its maximum and 
the Herfindahl index is equal to 1. 
FIRM SIZE - number of employees. The firm size was also obtained from the 
questionnaire. A set of eight dummy variables was generated in order to account for variation 
across different firm sizes. The intervals range from “less than 50 employees” to “more than 
50,000 employees”. Except for the group “less than 50 employees” (= reference group), the 
dummies were included in the analysis. 
OPPOSITIONS - The variable contains the share of granted patents per inventor that were 
opposed by a third party within the opposition term of nine months after grant.  
STATUS - These variables provide information on the status of the patent applications. Three 
variables were included representing the shares of applications that were either granted, 
refused by the examiner or withdrawn by the applicant, for instance, due to the results of the 
search report. The status variables as well as the opposition variable are included to control 
for the value of the applications. 
CLAIMS - This variable contains the number of claims added up for the total number of 
patents per inventor. The claims define the scope of an invention for which patent protection 
is requested. As proposed by Trajtenberg (2005), the number of claims is included as a 
control variable for an observable characteristic of the inventions at the time of filing.  
TEMPORAL CONCENTRATION - This variable controls for temporal effects, i.e. this 
measure reveals whether an inventor kept on inventing constantly during his inventive life or 
whether he carried out his inventions within a short period of time. The index was calculated 
as follows: 
(2) 
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nsapplicatioofnumber
nsapplicatioofnumber
TEMP tCON
(max)
=  
where t(max) is the application year, in which the inventor holds the maximum number of 
applications. In the event the inventor’s applications are all applied for in the same priority 
year, the index is at its maximum, and equals 1. 
REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS - This set of dummies indicates whether the inventions 
were made in a city with more than 1 million inhabitants or in a city with between 500,000 
and 1 million inhabitants. The reference group relates to inventions made in rural areas or 
cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants.14 
 
4 Descriptive Statistics and Multivariate Results  
4.1 Descriptive Results 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics. The final sample consists of 2,409 different inventors15, 
of which 37% changed their employer at least once. In the following, these inventors are 
classified as mobile. Each inventor is on average responsible for 14.7 EP patents, the number 
of patents per inventor ranges between a minimum of 2 patents and a maximum of 308 
patents. On average 6% of the inventors’ granted patents were opposed by a third party, on 
                                                 
14
  Although the answers to the questionnaire were related to specific patents, the answers concerning the 
environment of the invention seem to be transferable to all patents of an inventor. To test this assumption, 30 
mobile inventors were chosen by random to analyze whether the address of these inventors changed over 
time. Mobile inventors were used since these inventors are rather at risk of changing the home address than 
inventors who have not changed their employer. Results reveal that only three out of 30 mobile inventors 
changed their address. Whereas one inventor moved abroad (from a large city in Germany to a small town in 
Great Britain), the second one moved within Germany (both cities had a comparable size and have been 
sorted in the same city size group). The third one moved within the same city. The last two moves are thus of 
no relevance since they were sorted in the correct group. Overall, 1 out of 30 inventors is characterized by a 
address change relevant for the “inventive environment” variable. This share of inventors (3%) should not 
lead to large biases when transferring the answers related to one specific patent to all patents of the inventors. 
15
  The sample used within this analysis only includes inventors employed with firms. Academic inventors were 
excluded from the sample. Finally, 2,409 questionnaires were filled out completely with regard to the above 
mentioned variables. 
(3) 
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average 12% of the applications had been withdrawn by the applicant, and 2% had been 
refused by the patent examiner. 
Respondents were aged between 28 and 84 with a mean at 54 at the time they answered the 
questionnaire. Furthermore, the responding inventors are characterized by a high level of 
education. 12% have a high school diploma or went through a vocational training, 52% have a 
university degree, and 36% have a doctoral or post doctoral degree. Users and patent 
documents turned out to be the most popular sources of knowledge utilized during the 
invention process: 73% of the inventors believe users to be an important source of knowledge, 
and 66% make use of other patent documents, whereas only 22% of the respondents believe 
university research to be important for making inventions.  
Furthermore, the inventors were asked about the importance of different incentives for their 
inventive activity. An increase in salary is classified as an important incentive by 67%. 
Compared to the other incentives, advancement seems to be less critical, as only 59% of all 
inventors rank advancement to be important for inventive activity. The industry specific 
patent propensity is almost equally distributed across the three categories. 28% of the 
inventors are mainly active in sectors characterized by a low patent propensity. 35% (37%) of 
the inventors are classified as active in sectors with a medium (high) patent propensity. 
Technical concentration has its mean at 0.68, ranging between 0.14 and 1. This means that the 
inventors make on average more than two-thirds of their inventions in one technical area. The 
temporal concentration of the inventive activity has its mean at 0.36, ranging between 0.08 
and 1. A mean of 0.36 implies that inventors on average applied for 36% of their patents in 
one year which means that inventive activity is not too concentrated within a short time.  
[Table 4 about here] 
On average, the patent assignees’ firms have 48,880 employees. The number of employees 
ranges between 1 and 550,000. In the multivariate analysis firm size groups are used. Finally, 
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the inventors were asked about the environment of the invention that is whether the inventions 
were made in large cities or in rural areas. 10% of the respondents stated that the inventions 
were made in a city with more than 1 million inhabitants, while 13% reported that the 
invention was made in a city with 500,000 to 1 million inhabitants. Finally, 77% of the 
inventors made their inventions in rural areas or cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants. 
To provide a more detailed description of the productivity variable, Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of inventor productivity.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Productivity was calculated as the cumulative number of applications per inventor divided by 
the age of the inventor in 2002 minus 25. The histogram displayed in Figure 1 supports the 
findings of Lotka (1926) that the distribution of productivity among researchers is highly 
skew. Due to the skewness of the productivity distribution, a logarithmic transformation of 
the productivity variable is used in the following multivariate analysis. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 reports the distribution of the number of moves per inventor. 1,526 inventors (63%) 
have not moved at all. 516 inventors (21%) changed their employer once, 217 inventors (9%) 
changed their employer twice and only 27 responding inventors (1%) moved more than five 
times. Due to the fact that almost two-thirds of the inventors have not moved at all and 
another 20% changed their employer only once, it is assumed that the aggregation of the 
number of moves to a dummy variable, only indicating whether the inventor moved or not, 
does not lead to a loss of important information. Particularly, since the aggregation concerns 
only about 17% of the inventors, i.e., those who moved more than once. 
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 4.2  Multivariate Specification 
In this paper, an endogenous relationship between productivity and mobility of inventors is 
expected. To avoid biased results, a method of instrumental variables (IV) is used. In 
particular, IVREG and IVPROBIT16 will be employed. IV estimation is applicable for 
simultaneous or causal relationships if it is reasonable to maintain that some regressors are 
determinants of one dependent variable (e.g., PRODUCTIVITY) but not of the other variable 
(e.g., MOBILITY). These variables constitute instruments for PRODUCTIVITY in the 
MOBILITY equation. This strategy permits a consistent estimation of the mobility equation. 
The productivity equation can be estimated in the same way, using a second IV regression 
estimation (Mullahy/Sindelar 1996, Wooldridge 1999). 
 
                                                 
16
 Since mobility is a binary variable, the equation is estimated using the maximum-likelihood version of Stata’s 
IVPROBIT routine. 
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MOBILITY is a function of: 
PRODUCTIVITY the endogenous variable 
X1 – Xn a number of exogenous variables, which are also 
assumed to determine PRODUCTIVITY 
incentives, technical concentration, 
and regional characteristics, 
additional exogenous variables that only affect 
MOBILITY; these additional exogenous variables will 
instrument for MOBILITY in the PRODUCTIVITY 
equation 
 
The regional characteristics of the invention (whether the invention was made in a large city 
or rather in a rural area), for instance, are assumed to serve as instrumental variables. 
Inventions made in larger cities should have a larger signaling effect leading to a higher 
probability of getting a job offer by a competitor. The productivity of an inventor, on the 
contrary, remains unaffected by environmental differences. This result seems to be surprising, 
since already Marshall (1890) shows that companies within the same industries cluster 
because industrial districts can benefit from spillovers of specialized knowledge. 
Additionally, firms in clusters may profit from the same economies of scale that normally 
only large companies are able to realize (Norton 2000). Since Marshall’s seminal work the 
importance of clusters and agglomeration effects to enhance innovation has been confirmed 
extensively in the literature (e.g., Brouwer et al. 1999, Saxenian 1994). Nevertheless, local 
characteristics do not matter with respect to the productivity of an inventor. A possible 
explanation for this result, mentioned by Gambardella et al. (2006), is that geographic 
spillovers and local advantages may only be important in particular industries, for instance, in 
biotechnology or special high-tech industries. However, the data used in this paper cover a 
large spectrum of industries. Analyzing US patent data, Bettencourt et al. (2007, p. 12) find 
that larger metropolitan areas have more inventors than smaller ones and generate also more 
patents. But their results also indicate that “agglomeration […] does not increase on average 
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the productivity of the individual inventor”. It is, therefore, also possible that urban 
agglomerations cause a selection effect. In particular, large cities may attract and maintain 
more high quality human capital. Consequently, local characteristics do not significantly 
affect productivity after controlling for the individual characteristics of the inventor.  
 
PRODUCTIVITY is a function of: 
MOBILITY the endogenous variable 
X1 – Xn a number of exogenous variables, which are also 
assumed to determine MOBILITY 
external sources of knowledge additional exogenous variables that only affect 
PRODUCTIVITY; these additional exogenous 
variables will instrument for PRODUCTIVITY in the 
MOBILITY equation 
 
External sources of knowledge can positively influence inventor productivity. Patent 
documents, for instance, allow inventors to collect relevant research information about the 
state of the art or about inventions made by competitors. Additionally, scientific literature is 
assumed to have a positive impact on inventor productivity. Inventors can use this source of 
knowledge to catch up on the actual state of basic research. Furthermore, basic research could 
form a source of idea creating for applied research.  
The use of patent and scientific literature should not have a significant influence on the 
mobility of inventors, since reading patents or scientific articles does not lead to a personal 
contact between the inventor and the applicant or the author of the article. Thus, there is no 
reason to believe that the inventors would receive information from job vacancies in a 
company. Granovetter’s theory of “the strength of weak ties” also confirms that personal 
contact is needed to establish weak ties (Granovetter 1974, 1983). Montgomery (1991) 
confirms the applicability of Granovetter’s results to the labor market. In particular, the author 
describes the importance of personal contacts as a source of employment information. 
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Due to the fact that PRODUCTIVITY is a continuous variable and MOBILITY is a binary 
variable, Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) that estimates two OLS regression models is not 
applicable. Therefore, in this paper a two-step procedure described by Wooldridge (2001, 
p. 623-625) is used, for which Wooldridge shows that the standard errors and test statistics 
remain asymptotically valid: 
 
• PRODUCTIVITY 
When estimating productivity, mobility, which is binary, is the only endogenous explanatory 
variable. Heckman (1978) calls this type of model a dummy endogenous variable model. 
Using the instruments described before, the following two-step IV method can be employed: 
 
Step 1:  Estimation of MOBILITY using a binary response model, i.e. a probit model, which 
uses maximum likelihood estimation to obtain the fitted probabilities iΦˆ . 
)_,_,,,...,(),|1( 1 charregcontechincentivesXXzxMOBILITYP nΦ==  
where z are the instruments. 
Step 2: Estimation of PROBILITY by IVREG including the fitted probabilities iΦˆ . 
),_,,...,,ˆ( 1 εknowsourceXXfTYPRODUCTIVI niΦ=  
 
• MOBILITY 
To estimate mobility, again the two-step procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2001) is 
applied. First an OLS regression is used to estimate the continuous endogenous explanatory 
variable (productivity). In step two again a method of IV is used. 
 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
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Step 1:  Estimation of PRODUCTIVITY using an OLS regression model including regressors 
that determine PRODUCTIVITY but not MOBILITY (= instruments) to obtain the fitted 
values ifˆ . 
),_,,...,( 1 εknowsourceXXfTYPRODUCTIVI n=  
Step 2: Estimation of MOBILITY by IVPROBIT including the fitted values ifˆ . 
)_,_,,,...,,ˆ()ˆ,,|1( 1 charregcontechincentivesXXffzxMOBILITYP nii Φ==  
 
4.3 Discussion of the Results 
Table 5 provides the results of the IVREG and the IVPROBIT regression estimations. 
Model (1) contains control variables and explanatory variables required to test the hypotheses 
as well as two dummy variables that control for the patent propensity of the industries in 
which the inventor is mainly active. Model (2) includes variables controlling for the variation 
between technical areas to check whether the patent propensity dummies, based on the results 
of Arundel and Kabla (1998) and Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999), were defined accurately. 
Comparing the results of Model (1) and Model (2) reveals that the patent propensity dummies 
work quite well. In particular, the dummies also explain industry effects leading to a decrease 
of the firm size effects in Model (1) compared to Model (2) (with respect to productivity and 
mobility). For both models, endogeneity tests were conducted. Endogeneity of the mobility 
dummy in the productivity regression was tested using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity (Hausman 1978). To test whether productivity is endogenous in the mobility 
regression, the Wald test of endogeneity (Wooldridge 2001) was used. The null hypothesis of 
both tests indicates that the tested regressors are exogenous. A rejection of the null hypothesis 
means that the endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are important, and the 
application of instrumental variables techniques is required. Table 5 (columns 1 and 2) show 
(5.1) 
(5.2) 
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that both tests reject exogeneity of the tested regressors. Therefore, the application of IV 
estimation is appropriate. In the following the results of Model (1) are described in more 
detail.  
[Table 5 about here] 
• Productivity 
I first discuss the results with respect to the productivity equation (Table 5, column 1). The 
log(age-25) was included as an independent variable to account for a relationship between age 
and productivity which may be not proportional. A coefficient of -0.82 implies a negative 
marginal productivity with regard to the age of the inventor. This means that the absolute 
number of patent applications per inventor increases over time, while the inventors’ 
productivity (defined as the number of patent applications divided by age) decreases. Thus, 
when age increases by 10%, productivity decreases by 8.2%. The effect is significant at the 
1% level. According to the literature a decreasing marginal productivity of R&D personnel 
may be explained by a decrease of motivation and risk-taking as well as by difficulties in 
keeping up with technological change (Dalton/Thompson 1971; Lehman 1966; Oberg 1960). 
Another possible explanation is that inventors are gradually promoted into management 
positions and therefore spend less time on inventing due to increasing administrative duties. 
Table 5 (column 1) shows that the level of education is not associated with inventive output. 
Inventors who have a university or a doctoral degree do not show a higher productivity 
compared to the reference group (inventors who earned a high school diploma or less). This 
finding is surprising since many studies have pointed to a positive relationship between the 
educational degree and inventive output (e.g., Shockley 1957). In case a positive relationship 
between education and productivity does actually exist, the question is why the data do not 
reveal this relationship. An explanation for this result may be that the number of patents per 
inventor (= output quantity) was used as a productivity measure and that output quantity is 
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less dependent on the characteristics of individual inventors (with exception of age and 
experience) than, e.g., output quality. Especially in large firms, R&D management may 
determine whether to file a patent application for an invention or how much to spend on 
R&D. It is also possible that this finding is the result of a selection effect. In particular, 
assume that inventors need a certain intellectual ability to invent which is also required for 
higher education. Consequently, most people with high levels of education have a 
disproportional share of inventions. However, since this study selected inventors who have at 
least one patented invention, every inventor should be above this threshold of intellectual 
ability and, consequently, education does not show a significant effect. However, hypothesis 
P1 is not supported by the data. 
Model (1a) further reveals that exploiting the knowledge from other patent documents has no 
significant effect on productivity. Basically, making use of scientific literature reduces 
productivity by 6%. The coefficient of the variable “use of scientific literature” is significant 
at the 1% level. A reason for this negative effect may be that inventors who attach importance 
to scientific literature conduct basic research rather than applied research. Since basic research 
compared to applied research results in longer and more extensive R&D processes, basic 
research should result in a lower application rate per years of inventive activity. Another 
explanation may be that absorptive capacity is needed to adequately profit from scientific 
knowledge. Model (1a) supports the proposition that applying scientific knowledge requires 
absorptive capacity. In particular, inventors who use scientific literature and who have a 
doctoral or post-doctoral degree increase their productivity by 4%17. The interaction between 
doctoral studies and spillovers from university research is not significant. These results, at 
least in part, support hypothesis P3, hypothesis P2 is neglected by the data. 
                                                 
17
  The overall effect is calculated by adding up the effect of “source of scientific literature” (-0.061) and the 
effect of the interaction term “doctoral studies * scientific_litarature” (0.100). 
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Firm size is positively associated with productivity. The coefficients (except for 51 – 250 
employees) are significant at the 1% level. Productivity increases almost monotonically with 
firm size. A productivity increase with firm size can arise due to large firms adopting new 
technologies earlier. Additionally, they have more resources to hire and retain high quality 
researchers and to provide incentives for inventive activity. A second reason for this 
relationship may be that R&D is organized differently in large firms. Possibly, scientists in 
large R&D departments are highly specialized and play a smaller role in any single R&D 
project but are involved in different projects at the same time (Kim et al. 2004). Overall, 
hypothesis P4 is supported by the data. 
The control variables: the share of patents opposed and the share of applications withdrawn, 
contribute to the explanation of inventive productivity. The cumulative number of claims also 
explains inventor productivity. The share of patents opposed is negatively associated with 
inventor productivity, the number of claims positively. The share of patents withdrawn by the 
applicant is also positively associated with inventive output. Finally, as expected, inventors 
working in industries with a higher patent propensity are more productive that inventors 
working in industries where patents play a smaller role. 
• Mobility 
Model (1b) reported in Table 5 (columns 2 and 3) relates the probability to observe a move to 
a number of explanatory variables, characterizing the inventor as well as the work 
environment.  
The set of dummies controlling for the level of education of the inventor shows that an 
increasing level of education raises the probability of a move. A university degree raises the 
probability that an inventor changes his employer by about 8.5%, a doctoral or post-doctoral 
degree by about 9.4% (compared to the reference group: high school or less). These findings 
support hypothesis M1 that mobility is more common among inventors with a higher level of 
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education. This finding complies with the existing literature; in particular, the level of 
education which is observable is a factor in reducing uncertainty in job negotiations (Spence 
1973).  
Furthermore, a number of dummy variables were included in the regression estimation to 
control for the effect of different incentives. An improvement of working conditions does not 
significantly influence inventor mobility. Advancement, as expected, has a significant effect 
on the probability of a move. Classification of advancement as important for inventive 
activity increases the probability that an inventor changes his employer by 5%. Possibly, 
inventors who regard advancement as an important incentive for inventive activity are more 
receptive to job offers from competitors. This finding also supports the proposition of Allen 
and Katz (1985) that career opportunities for technical professionals are often unsatisfactory, 
resulting in a quit. Whereas hypothesis M3 is not supported, hypothesis M2 is supported by 
the data. 
As expected, an increase in firm size negatively influences the inventors’ probability to move. 
The probability of a move decreases almost monotonically with firm size. For instance, 
inventors working for firms with 5,001-10,000 employees move 17% less likely compared to 
the reference group (less than 51 employees). These findings support hypothesis M4 that 
mobility is less likely in large firms. First of all, jobs with large firms are more stable. 
Secondly, R&D departments of large firms dispose of more resources, which are of great 
interest to the inventors.  
Finally, hypothesis M5 is also supported by the data. Inventors whose inventions are 
concentrated in a smaller number of technical areas are less likely to move. In particular, an 
increase in technical concentration by one unit decreases mobility by 18.4%. This result is in 
accordance with the findings in the literature. Technical specialization leads to an increase in 
firm-specific human capital, resulting in a lower value of the inventor to the job market. 
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A set of control variables was further factored into the regression. First of all, the age of the 
inventor was included. Results show that age does not significantly influence the probability 
to observe a move. Temporal concentration of inventive activity is used to show whether an 
inventor kept on inventing constantly during his inventive life or whether he developed his 
inventions within a short period of time. Results reveal that a higher temporal concentration 
decreases the probability of a move. An explanation for this finding could be that inventors, 
who keep on inventing continuously, are more visible and are of more interest to other firms.  
Additionally, a set of dummy variables was included to control for the environment of the 
invention. The dummies indicate whether the invention was made in a city with more than 1 
million inhabitants or in a city with 500,000 to 1 million inhabitants. The reference group 
relates to inventions made in rural areas or cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants. Both 
coefficients are highly significant and possess a positive sign which means that inventors who 
are active in larger cities are more likely to move. Again, this is not surprising, since large 
cities provide more job opportunities. In rural areas, inter-firm mobility often forces 
employees to an inter-regional move leading to an increase in mobility costs for the inventor. 
Finally, mobility is more common in industries with a medium patent propensity compared to 
the reference group (low patent propensity).  
• Causality 
After all, the findings concerning the causality between inventor productivity and inventor 
mobility will be provided. Results confirm that there is a simultaneous relationship between 
inventor productivity and inventor mobility. Model (1a) shows that movers are 14.5% more 
productive than non-movers. The coefficient is significant at the 5% level. This outcome is in 
accordance with the findings of the literature that mobility can lead to a better match between 
employer and employee, resulting in a higher productivity of the employee. This result could 
also mean that a move increases the technical skills or the experience of an inventor - for 
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instance, due to knowledge spillovers from colleagues - resulting in a higher productivity. In 
contrast, Model (1b) indicates that an increase in productivity by one unit decreases the 
probability of a move by 18%. The effect is significant at the 1% level. This result may be 
explained by the fact that productive inventors have found good matches and may not want to 
move. It is also possible that productive inventors receive job offers from competitors but 
they do not change because incentive systems within their firm encourage them to stay. 
Another possible explanation for the negative causality between productivity and mobility can 
be special contracts or agreements, for instance, a non-compete agreement between the 
inventor and his employer. It is common practice that inventors, leaving their employer, are 
not allowed to work on the same area or project as before one (or more) year(s) after mobility 
took place. Non-compete agreements restrict employment options of the inventors outside the 
firm and therefore limit the inventors’ bargaining power over their employer (Fleming/Marx 
2005). This could either keep inventors from leaving at all or at least make the inventors less 
attractive for the job market. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, the causality between inventor productivity and inventor mobility was analyzed 
using instrumental variable approaches to deal with the endogeneity problem between 
productivity and mobility. One of the key findings of this paper is that there exists a 
simultaneous relationship between inventor mobility and inventor productivity: Movers are 
more productive than non-moving inventors. In contrast, more productive inventors are less 
likely to move.  
The results concerning the determinants of productivity and mobility provided in this paper 
have certain implications for the management of R&D personnel. First, the characteristics of a 
single individual seem to matter less when considering inventive output. This result suggests 
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that the composition of the inventor team could form a major determinant of inventive output. 
Therefore, further research should look more closely at inventor teams, especially on the 
effects of team composition on productivity. Possible determinants of team productivity may 
be a heterogeneous distribution of the characteristics and skills of the team members as well 
as team size. 
Second, the matching between employee and employer seems to be of particular importance. 
For R&D management as well as for inventors these results imply that both parties should try 
to maximize match quality. Since match quality is hardly to observe ex ante, R&D 
management could try to offer different contracts to inventors, resulting in a self-selection of 
heterogeneous individuals to these contracts. 
Finally, another issue relevant to the management of R&D has to be considered. Apart form 
the findings summarized above, the provided survey reveals that patent documents provide an 
important source of information for firms to identify valuable patents and also to identify high 
performing inventors. The number of patents an inventor is responsible for and the number of 
citations the inventor’s patents received from subsequent patents are a proxy for the 
productivity of an inventor. Reliable citation counts are only available after five to ten years 
after the application date which makes them unattractive for the labor market. By contrast, 
patents are published 18 months after the priority date which turns them into a valuable signal 
for ingenuity. Since patent applications are published in publicly available databases, 
information on inventors is actually available at low costs. From the point of view of a firm 
this “open job market” poses severe threats to loose key inventors who received a job offer 
from a competitor. Firms would rather like to keep information on inventors secret. However, 
due to legal regulations this is not possible. Consequently, firms have to undertake special 
efforts, e.g., they have to provide appropriate motivation and incentive systems or non-
compete agreements, to increase the commitment of important inventors to the firm. Inventors 
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take advantage of this legal regulation since they receive a compensation for their merits. On 
the part of the national economy, this “open job market” has the advantage of promoting job 
mobility, leading to a better match quality between the employee and the new employer. A 
better match quality in turn leads to a higher productivity of the employees and consequently 
to an increase of social welfare. 
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Table 1 
Example 1 (applicant sequence of inventor 1) 
 
PRIOYEAR APPLICANT   
1988 SIEMENS   
1989 SIEMENS   
2000 SIEMENS   
2001 Philips  move 
2001 SIEMENS  no move 
2002 Philips   
2002 Philips   
  
 
Table 2 
Example 2 (applicant sequence of inventor 2) 
 
PRIOYEAR APPLICANT   
1988 SIEMENS   
1989 SIEMENS   
2000 “inventor”  no move 
2001 SIEMENS   
2001 SIEMENS   
2002 SIEMENS    
  
 
Table 3  
Example 3 (applicant sequence of inventor 3) 
 
PRIO DATE APPLICANT   
 SIEMENS   
01/05/2000 SIEMENS   
01/05/2000 BASF  no move 
 SIEMENS   
 SIEMENS   
 SIEMENS    
 
 38 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics (N = 2,409) 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
mobility (dummy variable) 0.37  0 1 
number of moves 0.64 1.10 0 12 
number of patents  14.69 20.02 2 308 
number of claims 157.02 211.91 5 3,027 
share of granted patents opposed 0.06 0.11 0 1 
share of applications refused 0.02 0.05 0 1 
share of applications withdrawn 0.12 0.15 0 1 
age of the inventor in 2002 54.04 9.76 28 84 
level of education (terminal degree) 
secondary school/vocational 
training / high school diploma 0.12 
 0 1 
university studies 0.52  0 1 
doctoral/post-doctoral studies 0.36  0 1 
external sources of knowledge 
universities 0.22  0 1 
literature 0.63  0 1 
other patents 0.66  0 1 
users 0.73  0 1 
competitors 0.57  0 1 
incentives 
increase in salary 0.67  0 1 
advancement 0.59  0 1 
improvement of working conditions 0.64  0 1 
patent propensity (industry specific patenting intensity) 
low patent propensity 0.28  0 1 
medium patent propensity 0.35  0 1 
high patent propensity 0.37  0 1 
technical concentration 0.68 0.26 0.14 1 
temporal concentration 0.36 0.19 0.08 1 
firm size (no. of employees) 48,880 93,488 1 550,000 
regional characteristics 
more than 1 million inhabitants 0.10  0 1 
500,000 to 1 million inhabitants 0.13  0 1 
less than 500,000 inhabitants 0.77  0 1 
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Table 5 
IVREG and IVPROBIT Regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
  Model (1) 
  
(a) IVREG (b.1) IVPROBIT (b.2) (dy/dx)♦ 
dependent variable    log(productivity) dummy_mobil dummy_mobil 
productivity_hat [fitted values]   -0.491*** -0.184*** 
    [0.171] [0.055] 
mobil_hat [Pr(d_mobil)] 0.145*     
  [0.079]     
log(productivity age) (log(age-25)) -0.819***     
  [0.039]     
productivity age (age-25)   0.002 0.001 
    [0.003] [0.001] 
log(total number of claims) 0.740*** 0.237*** 0.089*** 
  [0.010] [0.050] [0.018] 
share of patents opposed -0.155** -0.19 -0.071 
  [0.064] [0.252] [0.098] 
share of patents refused 0.198 -0.11 -0.041 
  [0.157] [0.544] [0.223] 
share of patents withdrawn 0.242*** 0.565*** 0.211*** 
  [0.050] [0.183] [0.068] 
level of education, terminal degree (reference group: high school diploma or less)   
university studies 0.004 0.228** 0.085** 
  [0.022] [0.091] [0.034] 
doctoral/postdoctoral studies -0.032 0.249** 0.094** 
  [0.035] [0.102] [0.038] 
incentive - increase in salary   0.045 0.017 
    [0.073] [0.027] 
incentive - advancement   0.145** 0.054** 
    [0.070] [0.026] 
incentive - improvement of working cond.   -0.035 -0.013 
    [0.062] [0.023] 
source of knowledge - universities 0.006     
  [0.023]     
doctoral studies * knowledge_university -0.049     
  [0.035]     
source of knowledge - literature -0.061***     
  [0.019]     
doctoral studies * knowledge_literature 0.100***     
  [0.034]     
source of knowledge - other patents 0.018     
  [0.016]     
source of knowledge - user -0.018     
  [0.016]     
source of knowledge -  competitors 0.011     
  [0.015]     
Observations 2409 2409 2409 
F-test (df) / Chi2-test (df) F(25, 2383)=658.56 chi2(24)=223.27 chi2(24)=249.08 
R-squared 0.891     
Test of endogeneity:  H0: regressor is 
exogenous 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of  endogeneity 
Wald test of exogeneity 
 
 
chi2(1)=5.64, p=0.018 
chi2(1)=2.77, p=0.096   
Robust standard errors in brackets / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
♦ marginal effects after ivprobit computed with divprobit; the marginal effect of each independent variable is 
reported holding the remaining variables at their mean; for dummy variables dy/dx represents the discrete 
change from 0 to 1 
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Table 5 continued  
IVREG and IVPROBIT Regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
  Model (1) 
  
(a) IVREG (b.1) IVPROBIT (b.2) (dy/dx)♦ 
dependent variable    log(productivity) dummy_mobil dummy_mobil 
firm size in number of employees (reference group: less than 51 employees)   
51 - 250 employees 0.019 -0.204 -0.074 
  [0.040] [0.159] [0.055] 
251 - 500 employees 0.148*** -0.358** -0.124** 
  [0.042] [0.164] [0.051] 
501 - 1,500 employees 0.137*** -0.375** -0.131*** 
  [0.040] [0.148] [0.048] 
1,501 - 5,000 employees 0.179*** -0.615*** -0.207*** 
  [0.041] [0.146] [0.042] 
5,001 - 10,000 employees 0.225*** -0.513*** -0.173*** 
  [0.042] [0.159] [0.046] 
10,001 - 50,000 employees 0.283*** -0.705*** -0.235*** 
  [0.042] [0.148] [0.041] 
more than 50,000 employees 0.325*** -0.811*** -0.266*** 
  [0.042] [0.147] [0.040] 
technical concentration   -0.493*** -0.184*** 
    [0.112] [0.042] 
temporal concentration -0.632*** -0.698*** -0.261*** 
  [0.054] [0.191] [0.074] 
regional characteristics (reference group: less than 500,000 inhabitants)   
city with more than 1 mio inhabitants   0.291*** 0.112*** 
    [0.092] [0.036] 
city with 500.000 to 1 mio  inhabitants   0.497*** 0.193*** 
    [0.081] [0.032] 
patent propensity (patents per R&D expenditures) (reference group: industries with low patent propensty) 
high patent propensity 0.082*** 0.131 0.050* 
  [0.020] [0.081] [0.030] 
medium patent propensity 0.019 0.110* 0.041* 
  [0.016] [0.065] [0.025] 
distribution of patents across technical 
areas not included not included - 
      Wald test 
      
Constant -1.932*** -0.727**   
  [0.173] [0.311]   
Observations 2409 2409 2409 
F-test (df) / Chi2-test (df) F(25, 2383)=658.56 chi2(24)=223.27 chi2(24)=249.08 
R-squared 0.891     
Test of endogeneity:  H0: regressor is 
exogenous 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of  endogeneity 
Wald test of exogeneity 
 
 
chi2(1)=5.64, p=0.018 
chi2(1)=2.77, p=0.096   
Robust standard errors in brackets / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
♦ marginal effects after ivprobit computed with divprobit; the marginal effect of each independent variable is 
reported holding the remaining variables at their mean; for dummy variables dy/dx represents the discrete 
change from 0 to 1 
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Table 5 continued  
IVREG and IVPROBIT Regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
  Model (2) 
  
(a) IVREG (b.1) IVPROBIT (b.2) (dy/dx)♦ 
dependent variable    log(productivity) dummy_mobil dummy_mobil 
productivity_hat [fitted values]   -0.466*** -0.173*** 
    [0.176] [0.056] 
mobil_hat [Pr(d_mobil)] 0.221***     
  [0.085]     
log(productivity age) (log(age-25)) -0.802***     
  [0.040]     
productivity age (age-25)   0.002 0.001 
    [0.003] [0.001] 
log(total number of claims) 0.733*** 0.244*** 0.091*** 
  [0.010] [0.052] [0.018] 
share of patents opposed -0.146** -0.014 -0.005 
  [0.065] [0.260] [0.100] 
share of patents refused 0.238 -0.216 -0.080 
  [0.167] [0.544] [0.226] 
share of patents withdrawn 0.219*** 0.599*** 0.223*** 
  [0.052] [0.186] [0.070] 
level of education, terminal degree (reference group: high school diploma or less)  
university studies -0.005 0.213** 0.079** 
  [0.023] [0.093] [0.034] 
doctoral/postdoctoral studies -0.038 0.215** 0.081** 
  [0.036] [0.107] [0.039] 
incentive - increase in salary   0.053 0.020 
    [0.075] [0.027] 
incentive - advancement   0.138* 0.051* 
    [0.071] [0.026] 
incentive - improvement of working cond.   -0.022 -0.008 
    [0.063] [0.023] 
source of knowledge - universities 0.001     
  [0.024]     
doctoral studies * knowledge_university -0.03     
  [0.035]     
source of knowledge - literature -0.063***     
  [0.019]     
doctoral studies * knowledge_literature 0.088**     
  [0.035]     
source of knowledge - other patents 0.017     
  [0.017]     
source of knowledge - user -0.007     
  [0.017]     
source of knowledge -  competitors 0.011     
  [0.015]     
Observations 2409 2409 2409 
F-test (df) / Chi2-test (df) F(52,2356)=316.58 chi2(51)=288.60 chi2(51)=327.58 
R-squared 0.888     
Test of endogeneity:  H0: regressor is 
exogenous 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of  endogeneity 
Wald test of exogeneity 
 
 
chi2(1)=10.57, p=0.001 
chi2(1)=3.19, p=0.074   
Robust standard errors in brackets / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
♦ marginal effects after ivprobit computed with divprobit; the marginal effect of each independent variable is 
reported holding the remaining variables at their mean; for dummy variables dy/dx represents the discrete 
change from 0 to 1 
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Table 5 continued  
IVREG and IVPROBIT Regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
  Model (2) 
  
(a) IVREG (b.1) IVPROBIT (b.2) (dy/dx)♦ 
dependent variable    log(productivity) dummy_mobil dummy_mobil 
firm size in number of employees (reference group: less than 51 employees)   
51 - 250 employees 0.022 -0.170 -0.061 
  [0.042] [0.162] [0.057] 
251 - 500 employees 0.152*** -0.430** -0.146** 
  [0.044] [0.169] [0.050] 
501 - 1,500 employees 0.140*** -0.416*** -0.144** 
  [0.041] [0.152] [0.047] 
1,501 - 5,000 employees 0.183*** -0.706*** -0.231*** 
  [0.043] [0.151] [0.041] 
5,001 - 10,000 employees 0.208*** -0.564*** -0.186*** 
  [0.044] [0.164] [0.045] 
10,001 - 50,000 employees 0.264*** -0.771*** -0.251*** 
  [0.044] [0.154] [0.041] 
more than 50,000 employees 0.307*** -0.915*** -0.292*** 
  [0.046] [0.155] [0.039] 
technical concentration   -0.507*** -0.189*** 
    [0.119] [0.044] 
temporal concentration -0.605*** -0.775*** -0.288*** 
  [0.056] [0.194] [0.075] 
regional characteristics (reference group: less than 500,000 inhabitants) 
city with more than 1 mio inhabitants   0.222** 0.085** 
    [0.097] [0.038] 
city with 500.000 to 1 mio  inhabitants   0.492*** 0.191*** 
    [0.085] [0.033] 
patent propensity (patents per R&D expenditures) (reference group: industries with low patent propensty)  
high patent propensity       
        
medium patent propensity       
        
distribution of patents across technical 
areas included included - 
Chi2(29)=3.67 Chi2(29)=73.39   Wald test 
p=0.000 p=0.000   
Constant -1.974*** -0.911**   
  [0.185] [0.405]   
Observations 2409 2409 2409 
F-test (df) / Chi2-test (df) F(52,2356)=316.58 chi2(51)=288.60 chi2(51)=327.58 
R-squared 0.888     
Test of endogeneity:  H0: regressor is 
exogenous 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of  endogeneity 
Wald test of exogeneity 
 
 
chi2(1)=10.57, p=0.001 
chi2(1)=3.19, p=0.074   
Robust standard errors in brackets / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
♦ marginal effects after ivprobit computed with divprobit; the marginal effect of each independent variable is 
reported holding the remaining variables at their mean; for dummy variables dy/dx represents the discrete 
change from 0 to 1 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of inventor productivity  (N = 2,409) 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of the number of moves per inventor (N = 2,409) 
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